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COMMENT 
UNEQUAL TREATMENT OF 
UNITED STATES CITIZENS: 
ERODING THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
SAFEGUARDS 
INTRODUCTION 
On September 11, 2001, at 8:45 a.m. America witnessed a 
hijacked airplane flying into the North Tower of the World 
Trade Center in New York.1 While the building caught on fire 
and cries echoed into the streets, another plane crashed into 
the South Tower of the World Trade Center.2 Forty minutes 
later, a third plane crashed into the Pentagon.3 Five minutes 
after the South Tower collapsed, a fourth plane crashed into 
rural Pennsylvania.4 This horrific day ended the lives of 
thousands of people.5 
President, George W. Bush, addressing the nation said, 
"terrorist attacks can shake the foundations of our biggest 
buildings, but they cannot touch the foundation of America."6 
The President's address referred to the democracy and 
freedoms Americans enjoy. 7 Yet many Americans disagree 
with the President's address. The government's action post-
September 11th may have altered the democracy and freedoms 
1 CNN .com.lU. S. Chronology of terror, available at 
http://www.cnn.coml2001IUS/09/111chronology.attack (Sept. 12, 2002). 
2 Id. 
ald. 
4 Id. 
5 White House Official Site, Statement by the President In His Address to the 
Nation, available at http://www.whitehouse.goV/news/releases/2001l09/2001091l-
16.html(Sept.11. 2001). 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
207 
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guaranteed to citizens by the United States Constitution 
(hereinafter, "Constitution"). The constitutional safeguards, 
which lay the foundation for the democracy and freedoms 
Americans are guaranteed,8 may be eroding. Subsequent 
actions taken by the United States government after the 
September 11th attacks, aimed at protecting the United States, 
raise constitutional issues.9 Citizens are detained in military 
custody without being charged with crimes, incommunicado, 
and without access to counsel. According to Golden Gate 
University School of Law's Dean Peter Keane, "the most 
disturbing and the most dangerous result of last year's attack 
is the outrageous use of those tragic deaths by our government 
to drastically alter our democracy and brutalize our 
freedoms."lo 
Two United States citizens Jose Padilla (aka Abdullah AI 
Muhajir) (hereinafter, "Padilla") and Yesser Hamdi 
(hereinafter, "Hamdi") were labeled enemy combatants by 
President Bush, for alleged acts of terrorism connected with 
the September 11, 2001 attacks.l1 The government contends 
Padilla is a close associate of al Qaeda and participated in the 
planning of future terrorist acts against the United States. 12 In 
8 Id. This author is referring to the rights guaranteed to the United States 
Citizens under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution. See id. The Sixth Amendment provides each citizen with a right to 
counsel. U.S. Const. amend. VI. The Fourteenth Amendment provides no citizen shall 
be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process under the law. U.S. Const. 
amend. XIV. 
9 ABA Task Force on Treatment of Enemy Combatants, Preliminary Report at 2·4, 
available at http://www.abanet.orglleadership/enemy_combatants.pdf (Aug. 8, 2002). 
10 Interview with Peter G. Keane, Dean, Golden Gate University School of Law, in 
San Francisco, Cal. (Sept. 9, 2002). Peter G. Keane was appointed in 1999 as Dean of 
Golden Gate University School of Law. His appointment follows a twenty·year career 
as Chief Assistant Public Defender of San Francisco. Id. In addition, he was in the 
private practice of law from 1968·1979. Id. Dean Keane is a former President of the 
Bar Association of San Francisco and a former Vice President of the State Bar of 
California. Id. He has appeared on The CBS Evening News, CNN, BBC, ABC World 
News, Larry King Live, Nightline, Burden of Proof, MSNBC InterNight, and other 
news programs throughout the world. Id. 
11 Resp't Resp. Mot. Dismiss, Am. Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 12·13, 15, 
Padilla v. Bush (Aug. 27, 2002) citing Hamdi v. Rumsfield, 296 F.3d 279, 281 (2002), 
available http://news.findlaw.comlhdocs/docs/terrorism/padillabush82702grsp.pdf. 
According to the United States government an enemy combatant 
[ajrises in the context of foreign relations and national security ... [related toj military· 
related judgments in times of active hostilities [for thej protection of Americans .. , 
against unprovoked attack[sj. Id.; See discussion infra Part LD, II.A. 
12 Resp't Resp. Mot. Dismiss, Am. Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 8, Padilla v. 
Bush (Aug. 27, 2002), available 
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addition, the government believes Padilla possesses 
information that could aid the United States in preventing 
future attacks. 13 Similarly the government concluded Hamdi, 
based on his background and experience, has considerable 
knowledge of the Taliban and al Qaeda training and 
operations.14 The government deems this information as 
potentially valuable to the United States security.15 
Meanwhile, another United States citizen, John Phillip 
Walker Lindh, (hereinafter, "Lindh") although not labeled an 
enemy combatant, pled guilty in a civilian courtroom to aiding 
the Taliban and possessing explosives in the commission of 
that crime.16 By not labeling Lindh an enemy combatant, he 
enjoyed constitutional safeguards denied to Padilla and 
Hamdi.17 Because Padilla and Hamdi are held as enemy 
combatants, they are detained indefinitely without officially 
being charged with a crime. Additionally, they are held 
incommunicado and without a right to counsel. Depriving 
citizens of liberty without due process of the law, as has been 
done with both Padilla and Hamdi, raises critical constitutional 
concerns. 
The purpose of this comment is not to criticize the 
government's efforts in apprehending those responsible for the 
September 11th terrorist attacks. Rather, this comment 
examines the unequal treatment of United States citizens who 
are labeled enemy combatants by looking at the factual and 
procedural background of Padilla, Hamdi and Lindh. Next, 
http://news.findlaw.comlhdocsldocslterrorismlpadillabush82702grsp. pdf; AI Qaida also 
spelled AI Qaeda is a terrorist group dedicated to opposing non-Islamic governments 
with force and violence. Indictment at 2,United States v. Lindh (Feb. 5, 2002), 
available http://news.findlaw.comlhdocsldocsllindhluswlindh020502cmp.html. 
13 Resp't Resp. Mot. Dismiss Am. Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 8, Padilla vs. 
Bush (Aug. 27, 2002) citing President Bush's Order (June 9, 2002), available 
http://news.findlaw.comlhdocs/docslterrorismlpadillabush82702grsp.pdf. 
14 Br. Resp't-Appellants at 9, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (June 19, 2002), available 
http://news.findlaw.comlhdocs/docs/terrorismlhamdirums61902gbrf. pdf. The Taliban is 
an extremist form of Islam, which opposes any threat to its form of religion. 
Indictment at 3, United States v. Lindh (Feb. 5, 2002), available 
http://news.findlaw.comlhdocs/docs/lindhluswlindh020502cmp.html. 
15 Br. Resp't-Appellants at 9, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (June 19, 2002), available 
http://news.findlaw.comlhdocs/docslterrorismlhamdirums61902gbrf.pdf. 
16 Bob Franken and John King, 'I plead guilty,' Taliban American says Plea bargain 
precludes possible life sentence (July 2, 2002), CNN.coml Law Center, available at 
http://www.cnn.coml20021LA W 107/15/walker.lindh. hearing/. 
17 Id. 
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this comment examines the origins of the label enemy 
combatant and the constitutional safeguards afforded to 
criminal defendants in similar situations as Padilla, Hamdi, 
and Lindh. The terrorist acts Padilla, Hamdi, and Lindh are 
accused of involve international laws. Therefore, this comment 
will examine the Geneva Conventions as a means to 
understand humanitarian protections that may cover Padilla 
and Hamdi. Finally, this comment will provide 
recommendations for some of the issues raised. 
1. BACKGROUND 
A. JOSE PADILLA'S FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Jose Padilla is a United States citizen by birth. He was 
born on October 18, 1970, in Brooklyn, New York.l8 Padilla 
allegedly traveled to Pakistan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and 
Mghanistan as a close associate of the al Qaeda network. 19 In 
2001 and 2002, Padilla allegedly met with senior al Qaeda 
leaders on several occasions.20 Under the direction of al Qaeda 
leaders, Padilla received training embodying the wiring of 
explosive devices.21 According to the United States government, 
the training encompassed terrorist operations targeting the 
United States.22 These plans subsumed a scheme to detonate 
explosives devices in hotel rooms and gas stations and a 
"radiological dispersal device" (dirty bomb) within the United 
States.23 The United States government alleges Padilla, under 
the guidance of al Qaeda leaders, explored and advanced 
further terrorist attacks against the United States.24 The 
government argued that multiple intelligence sources 
confirmed Padilla's involvement in planning future terrorist 
attacks by al Qaeda. 25 President Bush recounted Padilla's 
18 Jonathan Weisman, Debbie Howlett and Dave Moniz, American terror suspect is 
not unique, USA TODAY (June 11, 2002), available at 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nationl2002/06/11/suspect-usat.htm. 
19 See supra note 11 at 7. 
20 [d. 
21 [d. 
22 [d. 
23 [d. at 7-8. 
24 [d. 
25 [d. at 8. 
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involvement and ordered his detention as an enemy combatant 
as follows: 
Padilla is closely associated with al Qaeda; that he has 
engaged in conduct that constituted hostile and war-like acts, 
including conduct in preparation for acts of international 
terrorism that had the aim to cause injury to or adverse 
effects on the United States; that he possesses intelligence, 
including intelligence about personnel and activities of al 
Qaeda that, if communicated to the U.S., would aid U.S. 
efforts to prevent attacks by al Qaeda; that he represents a 
continuing present and grave danger to the national security 
of the United States; and that his detention as an enemy 
combatant is necessary to prevent him from aiding al Qaeda 
in its efforts to attack the United States or its armed forces, 
other governmental personnel, or citizens. 26 
Padilla was arrested on May 8, 2002, at O'Hare 
International Airport, just outside of Chicago, Illinois, 
pursuant to a material witness warrant related to grand jury 
proceedings in the Southern District of New York (hereinafter, 
"SDNY").27 Padilla was detained at the Metropolitan 
Correctional Center in New York.28 On May 15, 2002, the 
Honorable Chief Judge Michael B. Mukasey assigned him 
defense counsel, Donna R. Newman.29 On June 9, 2002, 
President Bush determined Padilla was an enemy combatant 
and thus transferred him to the custody of the United States 
military. 30 On that same day, without informing defense 
counsel Newman, the Department of Justice requested that the 
SDNY vacate the material witness warrant.3! The 
government's request was granted.32 
26 [d. citing President Bush's Order (June 9, 2002). 
27 Mot. Dismiss, Am. Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 4·5, Padilla vs. Bush (June 
26, 2002), available 
http://news.findlaw.comlhdocs/docs/terrorism/padillabush62602gmot.pdf; Pet'r Reply 
Mot. Dismiss Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 4, Padilla v. Bush (July 12, 2002), 
available http://news.findlaw.comlhdocs/docs/terrorism/padillabush71202reply.pdf. 
28 Mot. Dismiss, Am. Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 5, Padilla vs. Bush (June 
26, 2002), available 
http://news.findlaw.comlhdocs/docslterrorism/padillabush62602gmot.pdf. 
29 Am. Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 2, Padilla v. Bush (June 19, 2002), 
available http://news.findlaw.comlhdocs/docslterrorism/padillabush61902apet.pdf. 
30 See supra note 28. 
31 Mot. Dismiss, Am. Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 5, Padilla v. Bush (June 26, 
2002), available 
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Now under the exclusive control of the United States 
military, Padilla was transported to the Consolidated Naval 
Brig in Charleston, South Carolina for detention and 
questioning.33 On June 11, 2002, after the material witness 
warrant was vacated, Newman, as next friend of Jose Padilla, 
filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus.34 The writ was 
amended on June 19, 2002.35 The amended petition of habeas 
corpus raises the three following claims challenging Padilla's 
detention: Padilla's detention violates the Fourth, Fifth, and 
Sixth Amendments of the United States Constitution; the 
Presidential Order under which Padilla is detained violates 
Article I of the United States Constitution; Padilla's detention 
in military custody is unlawful because the civilian courts are 
open and no martial law exists.36 
On June 26, 2002, the government filed a motion to 
dismiss the amended petition of habeas corpus.37 The 
government contends Newman lacks standing as next friend to 
bring the habeas corpus petition on behalf of Padilla. 38 
Further, the government argues President Bush, Secretary 
Donald Rumsfeld, and Attorney General Ashcroft are improper 
http://news.findlaw.comlhdocs/docslterrorismlpadillabush62602gmot.pdf; Pet'r Reply 
Mot. Dismiss Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 5, Padilla v. Bush (July 12, 2002), 
available http://news.findlaw.comlhdocs/docslterrorism/padillabush71202reply.pdf. 
32 See supra note 28. 
33 Id. 
34 Pet'r Reply Mot. Dismiss Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 5, Padilla v. Bush 
(July 12, 2002), available 
http://news.findlaw.comlhdocs/docs/terrorism/padillabush71202reply. pdf. A writ of 
habeas corpus is available to every person who claims to be unlawfully imprisoned or 
restrained. United States v. Commanding Officer, Armed Forces, 403. F.2d 371 (1968). 
28 U.S.C. § 2242 (2002) requires a writ of habeas corpus to be in writing, signed, and 
verified by the person whose relief is sought or by someone acting in his behalf. Id. 
Since Padilla is held incommunicado and without access to counsel, Donna Newman 
filed the writ of habeas corpus as next friend of Padilla. See supra note 29. The two 
requirements for a petition as next friend are set out in Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 
U.S. 149, 163-164 (1990). First, there must be an explanation outlining why the party 
for whom the relief is sought cannot sign and verify the writ. Id. Second, the next 
friend must be truly dedicated to the best interest of the person for whom relief is 
sought and a significant relationship between the real party in interest must exist. Id. 
35 See supra note 29 at 10. 
36 See supra note 11at 9-lD. Martial law is the will of the commanding officer. Ex 
Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 35 (1866). The notion that in certain cases a proclamation by 
a commanding officer supplants civil law is erroneous. Id. 
37 Mot. Dismiss, Am. Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Padilla vs. Bush (June 26, 
2002), available 
http://news.findlaw.comlhdocs/docs/terrorismlpadillabush62602gmot.pdf. 
38 Id. at 6-10. 
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respondents for the habeas corpus.39 Rather, Padilla's proper 
custodian is Commander M.A. Mar, the officer in charge of the 
brig where he is detained.40 The government further suggests 
the SDNY lacks territorial jurisdiction over the brig where 
Padilla is detained.41 On July 12, 2002, Newman filed a reply 
to the government's motion to dismiss arguing she possesses 
the proper standing as next friend to bring the habeas petition 
on Padilla's behalf.42 Newman maintains the SDNY has 
jurisdiction over the petition because the proper custodian is 
not the jailer.43 The reply states that Commander Marr is not 
authorized to deliver Padilla's body.44 Therefore, the proper 
respondents are President Bush and Secretary Rumsfeld.45 
In addition to Padilla's reply to the government's motion to 
dismiss, the New York State Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers (hereinafter, "NYSACDL") and the National 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (hereinafter, 
"NACDL") filed an amici curiae brief in the SDNY to inform the 
court of those issues NYSACDL and NACDL identified as 
critical to Padilla's case.46 These issues include: the court's 
subject matter and in personam jurisdiction over Padilla's case; 
Ms. Newman's proper status as "next friend"; President Bush 
and Secretary Rumsfeld status as proper respondents; 
Commander Marr's lack of authority as proper respondent; 
Padilla's illegal detention arising out of the denial of his 
Constitutional right to legal counsel and to communicate freely 
with an attorney; the court's ability to review Padilla's cases; 
Padilla's entitlement to "prisoner of war" status or in the 
alternative, a hearing as prescribed by the Geneva Conventions 
if viewed as an enemy combatant.47 On September 27, 2002, 
amici submitted a supplemental brief seeking to clarify its 
39 [d. at 10-16. 
40 [d. at 16-20. 
41 [d. 
42 Pet'r Reply Mot. Dismiss Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 6-11, Padilla v. Bush 
(July 12, 2002), available 
http://news.findlaw.comlhdocs/docslterrorismlpadillabush71202reply.pdf. 
43 [d. at 11-15. 
44 [d. at 21-24. 
45 [d. at 15-21. 
46 Br. Amici Curiae, Padilla v. Bush (July 2002), available 
http://news.findlaw.comlhdocs/docs/terrorismlpadillabush702ambrf.pdf. 
47 [d. 
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position in its initial brief.48 The sole issue amici identified in 
Padilla's case is his continued unlawful incommunicado 
detention in military custody as a civilian.49 
On August 27,2002, the government submitted a response 
and a motion to dismiss the amended petition for writ of 
habeas corpus asserting the lawfulness of Padilla's detention. 50 
The government maintains that the President's June 9, 2002, 
order and the sworn declaration from Michael Mobbs, Special 
Advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense For Policy, satisfy 
the judicial review for determining the lawfulness of Padilla's 
detention. 51 In Mobbs' unclassified declaration, he claims 
involvement with matters relating to the detention of enemy 
combatants. 52 In addition, Mobbs declaration states he 
examined governmental records and reports relevant to 
Padilla's case and the President's June 9, 2002 order that was 
based on multiple intelligence sources.53 However, the records, 
reports and the intelligence sources used for Mobbs' declaration 
are not cited. 54 
The government submitted a reply in support of its motion 
to dismiss the amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus on 
October 11, 2002.55 The government maintains that American 
jurisprudence allows the military to detain enemy combatants 
in absence of an official declaration of war.56 In addition, the 
government argues that Congress supported the President's 
48 Supplemental Br. Amici Curiae at 1, Padilla v. Bush (Sept. 27, 2002), available 
http://news.findlaw.comlhdocs/docs/terrorismlpadillabush92702ambrf.pdf. 
49 Id. Amici contends that the government's arguments failed in the following four 
ways: an extra-constitutional status is imposed on a citizen with the label enemy 
combatant; the United States is legally at war; even in the absence of martial law the 
American history supports the detention of citizens in military custody; the 
Commander in Chief warrants complete judicial deference. Id. at Part IV. 
60 Resp't Resp. Mot. Dismiss Am. Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 10-20, Padilla 
vs. Bush (Aug. 27, 2002), available 
http://news.findlaw.comlhdocs/docs/terrorism/padillabush92702ambrf.pdf. 
51 See supra note 11 at 15. 
52 Unclassified Decl. Michael H. Mobbs, Special Advisor to the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Policy at 1, Padilla v. Bush (Aug. 27, 2002), available 
http://news.findlaw.comlhdocs/docs/terrorismlpadillabush82702mobbs.pdf. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 1-6. 
55 Resp't Reply In Supp. Mot. Dismiss Am. Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Padilla 
v. Bush (Oct. 11, 2002), available 
http://news.findlaw.comlhdocs/docs/terrorismlpadillabushl 0 1102grply. pdf. 
56 Id. at Part I, Subpart A. 
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action.57 The government further argues the President's 
determination that Padilla is an enemy combatant is entitled 
to deferential treatment by the courts. 58 
The SDNY ordered the petitioner and respondents to 
submit additional briefing addressing Padilla's right to counsel 
and the propriety of Mobbs' declaration in camera and ex parte 
on· October 21, 2002.59 Seven days after the order, the 
government submitted its response arguing that Padilla has no 
right to counsel because he is an enemy combatant.6o The 
government asserts the purpose of Padilla's detention is 
twofold.61 First, his detention prevents him from aiding the 
enemy in executing attacks against the United States.62 
Second, his detention assists the United States military in 
gathering information necessary to carry out the war.63 The 
government contends the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is 
not triggered until the criminal prosecution against Padilla is 
initiated.64 
Further, the government contends that although the 
unclassified version of Mobbs' declaration alone establishes the 
proper determination of Padilla's status as an enemy 
combatant, the SDNY may consider Mobbs' classified 
declaration in camera and ex parte.65 The government 
maintains the classified version of Mobbs' declaration contains 
confidential intelligence materials.66 Moreover, the 
government argues that due to the ongoing armed conflict, the 
intelligence materials contained in the declaration are 
compelling reasons to keep Mobbs' classified declaration in 
camera and ex parte.67 
57 Id. at Part I, Subpart B. 
58 Id. at Part II. 
59 Resp't Response This Ct.'s October 21, 2002 Order at 1, Padilla v. Bush (Oct. 28, 
2002), available 
http://news.findlaw.comlhdocs/docs/terrorismlpadillabushl02802grsp.pdf. 
60 Id. 
6! Id. 
62 Id. at 1-2. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 3. 
65 Id. at 15. 
66 Id. at 15-21. 
67 Id. at 19. 
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On December 4, 2002, the SDNY delivered an opinion and 
order.68 The SDNY denied the government's motion to dismiss 
the amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus for Newman's 
lack of standing as next friend of Padilla.69 The court held the 
proper respondent in Padilla's case is Secretary Rumsfeld. 70 
The court further disclosed that it possesses the proper 
jurisdiction over the case and Secretary Rumsfeld.71 The 
SDNY, however, found the President has the constitutional 
68 Op. Order, Padilla v. Bush (Dec. 4, 2002), available 
http://news.findlaw.comlhdocs/docs/terrorismlpadillabush1204020pn.pdf. 
69 Id. at 24. The government contends Newman lacks the significant relationship 
required by next friend and cites Hamdi as authority. Id. at 18. The SDNY found that 
Newman was not an intruder or uninvited meddler posing as next of friend. Id. at 20. 
In fact, Newman consulted with Padilla as his defense counsel during the material 
witness proceedings. Id. at 19-20. In addition, Newman consulted with Padilla's family 
in her role as attorney. Id. at 20. Therefore, the SDNY found that Newman was the 
one person aware of Padilla's wishes and the person best equipped to achieve them. Id. 
The SDNY noted the legal issues between the material witness and habeas corpus 
proceedings are different. Id. The relationship, however, between Newman and Padilla 
has not changed. Id. Therefore, the SDNY held that Newman has standing to pursue 
Padilla's petition as next friend. Id. at 24. 
70 See supra note 68 at 24. The SDNY found the proper respondent for the writ of 
habeas corpus was Secretary Rumsfeld because of his personal involvement in Padilla's 
case. Id. at 32. The President's June 9, 2002 order, charged Secretary Rumsfeld with 
Padilla's detention. Id. He sent the Department of Defense personnel to take custody 
of Padilla. Id. Secretary Rumsfeld or his designee determined and sent Padilla to the 
brig in South Carolina. Id. Finally, Secretary Rumsfeld decides what information is 
releasable or filtered from Padilla and determines when the danger Padilla poses has 
passed. Id. Since Secretary Rumsfeld was the proper respondent, the SDNY found it 
unnecessary to reach a decision determining whether President Bush was the proper 
respondent in Padilla's case. Id. at 33. A second reason the court dismissed the 
President as a respondent is based on the relief Padilla seeks. Id. Padilla is not 
directly seeking relief from the President. Id. Based on the two above-mentioned 
reasons, President Bush was dismissed as a party to the case. Id. at 34. Similarly, 
Commander Mar was also dismissed because Secretary Rumsfeld, as proper 
respondent, could order him to comply with an order. Id. at 35-36. Thus, the court 
denied the government's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction or in the alternative 
transfer of Padilla's case to South Carolina. Id. at 3. 
71 See supra note 68 at 3. The court citing Title 18 of the United States Code 
Section 2241(a) held there was jurisdiction over Padilla's habeas corpus petition if it 
was authorized under New York's long arm statute. Id. at 44. New York's long arm 
statute permits a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over cases for non-resident that 
transact business in person or through an agent within the state. Id. at 45. The 
statute defines a business broadly and does not limit commercial transactions. Id. at 
45. Under New York's long arm statute, the SDNY found personal jurisdiction over 
Secretary Rumsfeld. Id. The court further denied the government's motion to transfer 
Padilla's case to South Carolina because the issues pertaining to the proper respondent 
and jurisdiction favored keeping the case in the SDNY. Id. at 46-47. The court also 
cited case law that suggested taking into consideration the convenience and 
practicality of the parties. Id. Therefore, the court found that those considerations 
supported keeping the case in the SDNY. Id. 
10
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authority to detain Padilla.72 Therefore, Padilla's detention is 
not per se unlawful.73 The court further held that Padilla may 
consult with counsel in matters aiding the habeas corpus 
petition. 74 The SDNY determined Padilla's status as an enemy 
combatant, is subject to the judicial review standard of some 
evidence.75 In addition, the SDNY will not use Mobbs' sealed 
declaration to determine whether the government has met the 
standard of some evidence. 76 The SDNY ordered both parties 
72 See supra note 68 at 46-52. The SDNY held that it was unnecessary for a 
congressional declaration of war to occur in order for the President to exercise his 
power in an armed conflict. Id. at 50. The SDNY citing the Prize cases, 67 U.S. (2 
Black) 635 (1862), found that the United States Supreme Court recognized a war 
without a declaration of war. Id. The court further reasoned that even if Congressional 
authorization were necessary, the joint resolution passed on September 14, 2001, 
fulfilled that requirement. Id. at 53. The court rationalized that the President's June 
9, 2002, order simply labeled Padilla an enemy combatant. Id. at 60-61. An enemy 
combatant is analogous to an unlawful combatant who is not subject to the protections 
of the Geneva Conventions. Id. The SDNY citing United States u. Lindh found the 
Taliban militia unqualified for lawful combatant status. Id. at 60. Therefore the SDNY 
held that the President's authority to order the detention of unlawful enemy 
combatants arises under the joint resolution and from his status as Commander-in-
Chief. Id. at 66. 
73 See supra note 68 at 3. In concluding Padilla's detention is not per se unlawful, 
the SDNY reasoned that the case falls within the exception of Title 18 of the United 
States Code Section 4001. Id. at 68-69. The court found that Padilla is in fact detained 
pursuant to an "Act of Congress," the joint resolution. Id. The SDNY further noted the 
joint resolution qualified as an act of Congress. Id. at 72. The court held that Title 18 
of the United States Code Section 4001(a) does not bar Padilla's detention. Id. at 74. 
Furthermore, the court held that Padilla detention is not barred as a matter oflaw. Id. 
74 See supra note 68 at 75. The SDNY held that Padilla has a right to present facts. 
Id at 75-76. This right is firmly rooted in the following statutes: Title 28 of the United 
States Code Section 2241; Title 28 of the United States Code Section 2243; Title 28 of 
the United States Code Section 2246, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures; Rules 
Governing Section 2254; Title 18 of the United States Code Section 3006(a)(2)(B). Id. at 
75-77. The court determined that the most convenient and useful vehicle for Padilla to 
present facts is through counsel. Id. at 75. The court, however, noted that Padilla has 
no right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
absent criminal proceeding. Id. at 77-78. 
75 See supra note 68 at 96-97. The SDNY will examine evidence supporting the 
President's June 9, 2002, order determining Padilla an enemy combatant by the 
standard of "some evidence." Id. The court cited the deference treatment the Supreme 
Court and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States u. Hamdi grant to the 
President's constitutional authority. Id. at 93-96. In addition, the court will examine 
whether that evidence is mooted by subsequent actions or events to Padilla's detention. 
Id. at 96. Specifically, the SDNY will look for "some evidence" suggesting that the 
government's papers support Padilla's hostile status. Id. at 97. 
76 See supra note 68 at 90. The SDNY found the sealed Mobbs' declaration did not 
broaden the nature of the accusations against Padilla compared to the unsealed Mobbs 
declaration. Id. at 100. The sealed Mobbs declaration sets forth objective 
circumstantial evidence collaborating factual allegations set out in the sealed Mobbs 
declaration. Id. Mter Padilla has the opportunity to contest the unsealed Mobbs 
declaration and if the SDNY finds the government failed to meet the "some evidence" 
11
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to discuss and arrange conditions for Newman's consultation 
with Padilla.77 The SDNY further scheduled the parties for a 
conference on December 30, 2002, to report the results of those 
discussions and arrangements and to schedule further 
proceedings.78 
B. YESSER HAMDI'S FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Yesser Hamdi is a United States citizen by birth.79 He was 
born on September 26, 1980, in Baton Rouge, Louisiana.80 In 
response to the al Qaeda terrorist network attack on the 
United States on September 11, 2001, the President ordered 
the United State s armed forces to apprehend al Qaeda and 
Taliban members.81 During this ongoing military operation, 
the United States Armed Forces captured Hamdi.82 He was 
initially detained at Camp X-Ray at the Naval Base in 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.83 When it came to light that he was 
born in Louisiana, and may be an American citizen, Hamdi was 
transported to the Norfolk Naval Station Brig.84 Allegedly, 
Hamdi possesses considerable knowledge about the Taliban 
and the al Qaeda network.85 Particularly his knowledge 
pertaining to their training and operations is potentially 
valuable information to the United States.86 Therefore, the 
United States determined Hamdi's continued detention as an 
enemy combatant comports with the laws and customs of war.87 
On May 10, 2002, the Federal Public Defender for the 
Eastern District of Virginia, Frank Dunham filed a writ of 
habeas corpus as next friend of Hamdi.88 On May 29, 2002, the 
district court granted the writ of habeas corpus and allowed 
test, the admission of the sealed Mobbs declaration will be reevaluated. Id. at 101. 
. 77 See supra note 68 at 102. 
78 Id. 
79 Yesser Hamdi, Birth Certificate, available 
http://news.findlaw.comlhdocs/docs/terrorismlhamdi92680birthc. pdf. (last visited Feb. 
25,2003). 
80 Id. 
8! Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 294 F.3d 598,601 (2002). 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 See supra note 15 at 9. 
86 Id. 
87 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 294 F.3d at 601. 
88 Id. at 600·601. 
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Hamdi unmonitored access to the public defender.89 The 
government filed a motion for stay in the court of appeals.90 
While these proceedings were pending, Esam Fouad Hamdi, 
Hamdi's father, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus as 
next friend. 91 On June 11, 2002, the district court concluded 
that Hamdi's father properly filed his case as next friend. 92 
The Federal Public Defender for the Eastern District of 
Virginia was appointed as counsel for the petitioners, and the 
court ordered the government to allow the public defender 
unmonitored access to Hamdi.93 On July 12, 2002, the Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's June 
11 th order mandating access to counsel and remanded the case 
for further proceedings because it appointed counsel and 
ordered access to the detainee without adequately considering 
the implications of its actions and before allowing the United 
States even to respond.94 On June 14, 2002, the government's 
motion to stay the proceedings connected with Hamdi was 
granted by the Fourth District Court of Appeals.95 
On July 31, 2002, the district court for the Eastern District 
of Virginia ordered the government to produce numerous 
materials that were redacted to protect intelligence 
information for in camera review.96 The court's production 
order requested sua sponte copies of all statements made by 
enemy combatants, notes taken from any interviews with 
enemy combatants, contact information on anyone who 
interrogated enemy combatants, copies of all statements made 
by the Northern Alliance concerning enemy combatants, and 
chronology of the detention of the enemy combatants while in 
military control. 97 The district court further ordered the 
89 [d. at 601-602. 
90 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 280 (2002). 
91 [d. 
92 [d. 
93 [d. 
94 [d. at 284. 
95 Order at 1-2, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (Aug. 7, 2002), available 
http://news.findlaw.comlhdocs/docs/terrorism/hamdirums080702ord.pdf. 
96 Resp't Mot. Relief From This Ct.'s Prod. Order of July 31, 2002 at 1, Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld (Aug. 5, 2002), available 
http://news.findlaw.comlhdocs/docs/terrorismlhamdirums080502gmot.pdf; Resp't Mem. 
In Supp. Mot. Relief from This Ct.'s Prod. Order of July 31, 2002 at 1-3, Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld (Aug. 5, 2002), available 
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/terrorism/hamdirums080502gmot. pdf. 
97 Resp't Mem. In Supp. Mot. Relief from This Ct.'s Prod. Order of July 31, 2002 at 
13
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government to appear for arguments on August 8, 2002, 
pertaining to the information submitted in accordance with its 
July 31st production order.98 
On August 5, 2002, the government filed a motion for relief 
from the district court's July 31st production order, on the 
grounds the order produced an insidious burden on the 
government.99 Further, the government contends the 
information is not necessary for the resolution of the habeas 
corpus petition or respondent's motion to dismiss.1°o On 
August 7, 2002, the district court's order issued an order 
canceling the hearing scheduled for August 8, 2002, pending 
Hamdi's motion to dissolve the stay with the court of 
appeals.101 
On August 8, 2002, the Fourth District Court of Appeals 
dissolved its June 14, 2002, stay order.102 The court of appeals 
furthered directed the district court to resolve the issue of 
whether Mobbs' declaration was sufficient, on its own, to detain 
Hamdi without being charged, without right to counsel, and 
incommunicado. 103 On August 16, 2002, pursuant to the 
directions provided by the court of appeals, the district court 
examined Mobbs' declaration, read briefs submitted by both 
parties, and heard oral arguments on the matter.104 The 
district court held Mobbs' declaration was insufficient to detain 
1-3, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (Aug. 5, 2002), available 
http://news.findlaw.comlhdocs/docslterrorismlhamdirums080502gmot.pdf. 
98 Id. at 1. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 6. 
101 See supra note 95. 
102 Order at 4-5, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (Aug. 16, 2002), available 
http://news.findlaw.comlhdocs/docs/terrorismlhamdirums81602ord.pdf. 
103 Id. at 1-2. Michael H. Mobbs declaration was attached to the Respondent's brief 
submitted on July 25, 2002. Id. at 9. Mobbs' Declaration was a two page long 
document, which failed to address critical issues to Hamdi's case. Id. The district 
court found the declaration lacked the following: the nature and authority Mobbs 
possesses to review and make declarations on behalf of the Executive Branch 
determining Hamdi's status; the authority a Special Advisor of Defense for Policy has 
for labeling citizens enemy combatants; intelligence information or the gathering of 
intelligence information pertaining to Hamdi; information explaining why Hamdi is 
treated differently than all other captured Taliban; the authority and the procedures 
used to conclude Hamdi's capture was lawful; the authority and the procedures 
authorizing Mobbs to supervise the classification of enemy combatants; details 
surrounding Hamdi's detention and transfer to military custody. Id. at 9-11. These 
questions were further asked during oral arguments and Respondents' counsel was 
unable to answer. Id. at 13. 
104 Id. 
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Hamdi.105 The government's motion for relief from the district 
court's production order on July 31st filed on August 5, 2002, 
was denied. 106 The court ordered the government to comply 
with its July 31st production order by August 21,2002.107 
On August 19, 2002, the government filed a motion for 
certification of interlocutory appeal and stay claiming the 
district court's August 16, 2002, holding implicates an 
important question of deferential treatment owed to military 
decisions and requires sensitive national security 
information. l08 The government contends the August 16, 2002, 
order involves a controlling issue of law, which will determine 
the outcome of the case.109 In addition, the government 
requests a stay of Hamdi's proceeding while the issue is 
resolved. llo 
C. JOHN PHILLIP WALKER LINDH'S FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL 
BACKGROUND 
John Phillip Walker Lindh is a United States citizen by 
birth.lll He was born in February 1981, in Washington, D.C.ll2 
Lindh's indictment alleged the following counts: 
[C]onspiracy to murder United States Nationals including 
civilians and military personnel by committing murder; 
conspiracy to provide materials support and resources to 
Harakat ul-Mujahideen (HUM) and providing material 
support and resources to the HUM; conspiracy to provide 
material support and resources to al Qaeda and providing 
material support and resources to al Qaeda; conspiracy to 
contribute services to al Qaeda and contributing services to al 
105 Id. at 2, 14. 
106 Id. at 2. 
107 Id. 
108 Resp't Mot. Certification Interlocutory Appeal and Stay at 1, Hamdi v. Rumsfield 
(Aug. 19, 2002), available 
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/terrorism/hamdirums81902gmot.pdf. A court may 
certify an interlocutory order under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) if the following criteria is met: 
an order involves a controlling question of law; substantial grounds for a difference of 
opinion regarding the question of law; an immediate appeal from the order may 
determine the outcome of the litigation. Id. at 2. 
\09 Id. 
110 Id. at 7-8. 
111 Profile: John Walker Lindh, (Thursday, Jan. 24, 2002), available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uklllhilworldlamericaslI779455.stm 
112 Id. 
15
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Qaeda; conspiracy to supply services to the Taliban and 
supplying services to the Taliban; using, carrying, and 
possessing firearms and destructive devices during violent 
crimes. 113 
On or about November 25,2001, Lindh surrendered to the 
Northern Alliance during an ongoing civil war against the 
Taliban.114 Johnny Spann, a Central Intelligence Agency 
employee was conducting interviews of captured Taliban 
personnel at the Aala-iJanghi (QIJ) compound near 
Mghanistan. 115 Among the individuals interviewed was 
Lindh. 116 Shortly after Spann interviewed Lindh, prisoners 
staged an uprising, which ultimately ended Spann's life.117 The 
situation was controlled after several days.118 Lindh was shot 
in the leg as he attempted to escape. 1l9 On December 1, 2001, 
the Northern Alliance soldiers detained Lindh with the 
assistance of United States military personnel.120 Mter Lindh 
was identified as a United States national, he was given 
medical assistance and interrogated.121 
113 Indictment at 6·14, United States u. Lindh (Feb. 5, 2002), available 
http://news.findlaw.comlhdocs/docsllindhluswlindh020502cmp.htmI. Harakat ul· 
Mujahideen (HUM) is a terrorist group dedicated to Islam's extremist views. Id. at 3. 
114 Criminal CompI. at 2, United States v. Lindh (Jan. 15, 2002), available 
http://news.findlaw.comlhdocs/docs/lindhluswlindh11502cmp.htmI. The Northern 
Alliance, which fought to overthrow the Taliban's militia control of Mghanistan, was a 
coalition of non-Pashtun groups who opposed the Taliban., Indictment at 3, United 
States v. Lindh (Feb. 5, 2002), available 
http://news.findlaw.comlhdocs/docsllindhluswlindh020502cmp.htmI. According to 
CNN, the United States exchanged and gave information to the Northern Alliance. 
Northern Alliance: U.S. strikes accurate, CNN Report available at 
http://www.cnn.com/2001fWORLD/asiapcf/centraU10107/ret.abdullah.attacks.cnnal 
(Oct. 7, 2001). 
115 Criminal CompI. at 2, United States v. Lindh (Jan. 15,2002), available 
http://news.findlaw.comlhdocs/docsllindhluswlindh11502cmp.htmI. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. at. 10. Pashtun is the ethnic majority in Mghanistan. Indictment at 3, 
United States v. Lindh (Feb. 5, 2002), available 
http://news.findlaw.comlhdocs/docsllindhluswlindh020502cmp.htmI. 
120 Br. Amici Curiae Int'l Human Rights Org. In Supp. of Def. Mot. Suppress 
Involuntary Statements and Evidence at 3, United States u. Lindh (June 18, 2002), 
available http://news.findlaw.comlhdocs/docsllindhluslindh 71002ammot. pdf. 
121 Criminal Com pI. at 2-3, United States u. Lindh (Jan. 15, 2002), available 
http://news.findlaw.comlhdocs/docsllindhluswlindh11502cmp.html. 
16
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 2 [2003], Art. 5
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol33/iss2/5
2003] UNEQUAL TREATMENT OF U.S. CITIZENS 223 
On March 15, 2002, the defense filed a motion to compel 
production of discovery with the Eastern District of Virginia.122 
The motion moved the court for an order compelling the 
government to comply with the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure 16(a).123 Lindh sought identifying information for 
the following individuals the government claimed as 
confidential sources: individuals who participated in his 
interrogations; individuals the government redacted from 
reports; individuals who wrote documents pertaining to 
statements allegedly made by Lindh; individuals who guarded 
and maintained contact with Lindh; and all other information 
referencing Lindh. 124 
On June 17, 2002, Lindh filed a motion to suppress 
involuntary statements and evidence.125 In support of Lindh's 
motion, the International Human Rights Organization filed a 
amici curiae brief on July 10, 2002.126 This amici consists of 
several human rights organizations dedicated to the consistent 
application of internationallaws.127 Amici identified two issues 
critical to Lindh's case.128 First, they allege the tortures, cruel, 
inhuman and degrading treatment endured by Lindh while in 
the custody of the United States, are prohibited by 
internationallaws.129 Second, they allege statements given by 
Lindh, obtained through torture and coercion, are forbidden by 
122 Notice Mot. and Mot. Compel Prod. Disc., United States v. Lindh (March 15, 
2002), available http;IInews.findlaw.comlhdocs/docsllindhluslindh31502discmot.pdf. 
123 [d. at 1. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 16(a) permits the defendant to 
obtain relevant written or recorded statements made before or after his or her arrest, if 
used at trial. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a). 
124 Notice Mot. and Mot. Compel Prod. Disc. at 2·9, United States v. Lindh (March 
15,2001), available http;lInews.findlaw.comlhdocs/docsllindhluslindh31502discmot.pdf. 
125 Def. Notice and Mot. Suppress Statements on Dec. 1, 2001, U.S. Special Forces 
and Robert Felton, United States v. Lindh (June 17, 2002), available 
http;IInews.findlaw.comlhdocs/docsllindhluslindh61702sfsupmot.pdf. 
126 Mot. Leave To File Br. of Amici Curiae and Br. of Amici Curiae Int'l Human 
Rights Org. In Supp. Def. Mot. Suppress Involuntary Statements and Evidence, United 
States v. Lindh (June 18, 2002), available 
http;lInews.findlaw.comlhdocs/docsllindhluslindh71002ammot.pdf. 
127 [d. at 1. The following organizations support Amici; the Center for 
Constitutional Rights, the Center for Justice & Accountability, the Extradition and 
Human Rights Committee of the American Branch of the International Law 
Association, Human Rights Advocates, and World Organization Against Torture USA. 
[d. at 1-4. 
128 Br. Amici Curiae Int'l Human Rights Org. In Supp. of Def. Mot. Suppress 
Involuntary Statements and Evidence at 5, United States v. Lindh (June 18, 2002), 
available http;lInews.findlaw.comlhdocsldocsllindhluslindh71002ammot.pdf. 
129 [d. 
17
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international laws.130 Amici sought to exclude evidence and 
statements obtained through coercion and torture. 131 
On July 15, 2002, Lindh and his team of lawyers entered 
into a plea agreement with United States Attorneys for the 
Eastern District of Virginia by pleading guilty to two crimes. 132 
The first crime consisted of supplying services to the Taliban. 133 
The second crime consisted of carrying explosives in the course 
of supplying services to the Taliban. 134 
In conjunction with the plea agreement, both parties 
stipulated and agreed to the following facts. On June 30, 2000, 
President William J. Clinton declared the nation in state of 
emergency because of threats posed by al Qaeda and the 
Taliban.135 The nation's state of emergency continued with 
President's Bush declaration that the Taliban continued to use 
Mghanistan as a safe heaven for the operations of Usama bin 
Laden and the al Qaeda network. 13G In Mayor June of 2001, 
Lindh traveled to Mghanistan with the purpose of assisting the 
Taliban in its fight against the Northern Alliance.137 During 
the same time, Lindh revealed to the Taliban recruiting 
personnel that he was an American citizen and wanted to fight 
in the front lines.13B Additionally, Lindh disclosed his desire to 
undergo military preparation at a training camp.139 Lindh 
participated fully in the training activities.140 His training 
included "weapons, orienteering, navigation, explosives and 
battlefield combat."141 Mter completing his training a;nd 
130 Id. 
131 Id. at 28-29. Some of the examples of torture and coercion Lindh endured are 
highlighted in Amici's brief. Id. at 3-5. Some of the examples are: Lindh bound, 
blindfolded, and handcuffed while in custody; derogatory and threatening statements 
including death threats; plastic straps used to bind Lindh's hands which cut into his 
skin and cut off his circulation; Lindh was stripped naked and bound to a stretcher; 
Lindh was placed in a metal storage container with no windows, and no heat source; 
Lindh was provided with minimal food and medical attention. Id. 
132 Def. Sentencing Mem. at 3,11, United States v. Lindh (Sept. 26, 2002), available 
http://news.findiaw.comlhdocs/docsllindhluslindh92602dsenmem.pdf. 
133 Id. at II. 
134 Id. 
135 Statement of Facts, United States v. Lindh (July 15, 2002), available 
http://news.findiaw.comlhdocs/docsllindhluslindh 71502sof. pdf. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. 
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pledging allegiance to jihad, Lindh traveled to the front line in 
Takhar, Mghanistan bearing an AKM rifle.142 Between 
September and November of 2001, Lindh and his fighting 
group rotated shifts fighting against the Northern Alliance.143 
Lindh, knowingly engaging in a commission of a felony, carried 
a rifle and grenades.144 
As part of the plea agreement, both parties concurred that 
Lindh's sentence would be twenty years in prison.145 Defense 
counsel, however, requested from the court that Lindh gain 
access to a facility with educational opportunities at the 
university level as well as one close to his family's residence in 
California. 146 Such a request was based on the notion that 
Lindh possessed knowledge and intelligence that could assist 
the United States in countering future terrorist threats.147 
Therefore, providing Lindh access to higher education can only 
further the United States efforts in countering future terrorist 
threats. 148 
D. ENEMY COMBATANT 
Labeling individuals as enemy combatants originated 
during World War II.149 On July 2, 1942, President Franklin 
D. Roosevelt issued Proclamation No. 2561 (hereinafter, 
"Proclamation") demanding that enemies entering the United 
States committing sabotage, espionage, or warlike acts be tried 
WIthin the laws ofwar.150 The proclamation asserted that any 
person charged with attempting to commit or committing 
sabotage, espionage, or warlike acts, is subject to a military 
tribunal and prohibited from seeking remedies from civilian 
United States Courts.151 The Proclamation cites the 
142 ld. 
143 [d. 
144 Id. 
145 Plea Agreement, United States v. Lindh (July 15, 2002), available 
http://news.findlaw.cOmlhdOCS/doCSllindhluSlindh71502Pleaag.Pdf· 
146Def.SentenCingMem.at1, United States v. Lindh (Sept. 26, 2002), available 
http://news.findlaw.comlhdocs/docsllindhluslindh92602dsenmem.pdf. 
147 Id. at 7-8. 
148 [d. 
149 See supra note 9 citing Ex parte Quirin v. United States, 317 U.S. 1 (1942). 
150 Proclamation No. 2561, 7 Fed. Reg. 5101, and in 56 Stat. 1964 (July 2, 1942). 
151 [d. 
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Constitution and United States Statues as authority for 
prosecuting individuals before military tribunals. 152 
The United States government contends that citizens are 
detainable indefinitely upon its "say-so."153 The government 
asserts the authority to label citizens as enemy combatants and 
cites Ex Parte Quirin for support. 154 In Ex Parte Quirin, the 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt acting within his power as 
Commander in Chief appointed a military commission to try 
the petitioners for "offensives against the law of war and the 
Articles of War ... "155 At the time, the United States declared 
war against the German Reich. 156 One of the accused claimed 
United States citizenship. 157 All of the accused, wearing 
German infantry uniforms, emerged from submarines and 
entered the United States carrying explosives, flammable 
articles and timing devices. 158 Upon coming ashore in the 
United States, they discarded their uniforms and embarked on 
the execution of their sabotage plans.159 They were 
apprehended before the execution of these plans.160 
The United States Supreme Court considered whether the 
President acted within his power when he authorized trials by 
military commissions. 161 The President, as Commander in 
Chief, appointed a Military Commission to try offenses against 
the laws of war.162 As Commander in Chief, the President 
must carry into effect all laws passed by Congress for the 
conduct of war.163 The Court explicitly stated that citizenship 
was not an issue in the case because the crime violated the 
laws of war.164 The Court held that the President's July 2, 
1942, Proclamation Order was authorized by the 
152 [d. 
153 See supra note 9 at 3; Hamdi, 296 F.3d at 283. The government contends that 
American citizens "alleged to be an enemy combatant could be detained indefinitely 
without charges or counsel on the government's say·so." [d. 
154 Hamdi, 296 F.3d at 283. 
155 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 22. 
156 [d. at 21. 
157 [d. at 20. 
158 [d. at 21. 
159 [d. 
160 [d. at 21. 
161 Id. at 29. 
162 [d. The President's power as Commander in Chief is derived from the 
Constitution. [d. at 25. 
163 [d. at 26. 
164 [d. at 37. 
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Constitution. 165 Thus, the President's measures ordering the 
accused to be tried before a military tribunal was lawful,l66 
In contrast to the facts in Ex Parte Quirin, Congress did 
not declared war at the time of Padilla, Hamdi, and Lindh's 
detention. On September 18, 2001, Congress passed a Joint 
Resolution but did not authorize an official declaration of 
war.167 The Joint Resolution authorized President Bush to: 
[U]se all necessary and appropriate force against those 
nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, 
authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks on 
September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or 
persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international 
terrorism against the United States by such nations, 
organizations or persons.168 
In addition to Ex parte Quirin, the government relied on In 
re Territo for its authority to detain enemy combatants 
irrespective of their United States citizenship. 169 In Territo, 
an American citizen was captured in the battlefield and legally 
held as a prisoner of war during World War II.l7O The Ninth 
Circuit acknowledged that the accused was a United States 
citizen, but deemed that citizenship did not shield the prisoner 
from the governing laws during a time of war,171 Thus, Territo 
provides authority for the government to detain a United 
States citizen as a prisoner of war.172 
In contrast to the cases the government cites as authority 
to detain enemy combatants irrespective of their citizenship, 
165 ld. at 48. 
166 ld. 
167 S.J. Res. 23, 107th Congo (2001) (enacted). In contrast to a joint resolution, the 
Senate and the House of Representatives expressly authorized an official congressional 
declaration of war in a statute. S.J. Res. 119, 77th Cong., 55 Stat. 796 (1941). The last 
congressional declaration of war occurred on December 11, 1941. ld. Congress declared 
war between the Government of Germany and the United States. ld. In addition, on 
the same day, Congress declared war between the Government of Italy and the United 
States. S.J.Res. 120, 77th Cong., 55 Stat 796, 797. In both statutes Congress formally 
declared war and authorized the President to employ the entire naval and military 
forces to engage in war against the respective governments and to bring the conflict to 
a successful termination. ld. 
168 S.J. Res. 23, 107th Congo (2001) (enacted). 
169 Hamdi, 296 F.3d at 283 citing In re Territo, 156 F.2d 142 (9th Cir. 1946). 
170 In re Territo, 156 F.2d at 145·146. 
171 ld. at 144.145. 
172 ld. at 148. 
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the American Bar Association Task Force on Treatment of 
Enemy Combatants, Newman, NYSACDL, and NACDL argue 
that the United States Supreme Court case Ex Parte Milligan 
is in fact, the controlling precedent for Padilla and Hamdi's 
case,173 In Ex Parte Miligan a military commander arrested a 
United States citizen in his Indiana residence,174 Upon trial 
before a military commission, Milligan was charged with 
conspiring against the United States, aiding rebels against the 
United States, inciting a rebellion, disloyal practices, and 
violating the laws of war,l75 Milligan challenged the 
commission's authority to prosecute him, however, the 
objection was overruled,l76 The military commission found 
Milligan guilty on all the charges and sentenced him to 
death,l77 Milligan filed his petition for writ of habeas corpus 
with the District Court of Indiana,l78 The Supreme Court 
granted certiorari,179 
The Court concluded that if President Andrew Johnson's 
Order detained a citizen, except as a prisoner of war, the Court 
could examme the lawfulness of the government's 
imprisonment,l80 The Court found that Milligan was 
imprisoned solely under the authority of the President,l81 The 
Court understood the Constitution to apply equally to all 
citizens in times of peace and war,l82 The Court held that the 
military commission did not have jurisdiction to prosecute 
Milligan,l83 
173 See supra note 9 at 19, 25; Am. Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 7, Padilla v. 
Bush (June 19, 2002), available 
http://news.findlaw.comlhdocsldocslterrorismlpadillabush61902apet.pdf; Supplemental 
Br. Amici Curiae at Part I, Subpart A, B, Padilla v. Bush (Sept. 27, 2002), available 
http://news.findlaw.comlhdocs/docs/terrorismlpadillabush92702ambrf.pdf. 
174 Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 6 (1866). 
175 [d. 
176 [d. at 7. 
177 [d. 
178 [d. 
179 [d. at 8-9. 
180 [d. at 116. 
181 [d. at 134. 
182 [d. at 120. 
183 [d. at 136. 
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E. THE MILITARY ORDER 
President Bush issued a Military Order on November 13, 
2001, entitled "Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain 
Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism."184 The President 
issued the military order in response to Congress' 
authorization to use all necessary force against those 
responsible for the September 11, 2001, attacks.185 Although 
Congress did not officially declare war, Hamdi and Padilla 
remain detained pursuant to Congress' Joint Resolution.186 
The President's Military Order authorized perpetrators acting 
alone or in concert, intending to engage or engaging in terrorist 
acts against the United States to be tried by a military 
commission.187 
The Military Order identifies the United States in a state 
of "national security," and provides data on international 
terrorists, naming members of al Qaeda as responsible for 
carrying out the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.188 The 
findings proclaim the attacks created a state of armed conflict, 
justifying the use of Armed Forces.189 In addition, the Military 
Order confers exclusive jurisdiction over non-citizens.l9o The 
President, however, may determine from "time to time" who 
the exclusive jurisdiction may cover.191 
As authority for executing the Military Order, President 
Bush cites Senate Joint Resolution 23 "Authorization for Use of 
Military Force" and Section 836 of Title 10 of the United States 
Code.l92 Joint Resolution 23 permits the President to use all 
necessary and appropriate force. 193 While Section 836 of Title 
184 Mil. Order, 66 Fed. Reg. 57833 (Nov. 13, 2001). 
185 Id. 
186 See supra note 11 at 11. 
187 Resp't Mot. Stay Mag. J. May 20, 2002 Order Regarding Access Mem. Supp. at 3-
4, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (May 23, 2002), available 
http://news.findlaw.comlhdocs/docslterrorismlhadmirum52302gmot.pdf; Resp't Resp. 
Mot. Dismiss, Am. Pet. For Writ of Habeas Corpus at 4-6, Padilla v. Bush (Aug. 27, 
2002), available 
http://news.findlaw.comlhdocs/docs/terrorismlpadillabush82702grsp.pdf; Mil. Order, 66 
Fed. Reg. 57833 (Nov. 13, 2001). 
188 Mil. Order, 66 Fed. Reg. 57833 at Section 1 (Nov. 13, 2001). 
189 Id. at Section l(a). 
190 Id. at Section 7(b)(1). 
191 Id. at Section 2(a), Section 7(b). 
192 See supra note 184. 
193 S.J. Res. 23, 107'h Congo (2001) (enacted); See supra note 9 at 6. 
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10 of the United States Code specifically states that the 
President may prescribe rules governing military tribunals and 
these rules are proper if they do not violate the Constitution.l94 
The Department of Defense was authorized to develop the 
policies and procedures for the military tribunals in accordance 
with the November 13, 2001 Military Order by President 
Bush.195 On March 21, 2002, the Department of Defense issued 
Military Commission Order No.1 (hereinafter, "Order") with 
the purpose of ensuring that individuals subject to the military 
tribunals receive a full and fair trial. 196 The accused may select 
a "detailed defense counsel," which is a military officer or a 
civilian attorney.197 The guidelines, however, are unlike the 
procedural rules that govern civilian courts. According to the 
Order, limited disclosure of protected information from 
documents is allowed in the proceedings.19B Evidence is 
admissible if it has reasonable probative value. 199 The 
commission may, on its own initiative, summon and hear 
witnesses via telephone, audiovisual or any other means it 
deems appropriate.20o 
Post-trial procedures consist of an administrative 
review.201 Mter the administrative review, a review panel 
examines the trial record.202 The review panel, in its 
discretion, may forward the record of trial to the Secretary of 
Defense or return the case to the "Appointed Authority" for 
further proceedings only if a "material error of law occurred."203 
The commission's charges and sentences including, death or 
life in prison, are binding when the President or the Secretary 
of Defense make the final decision.204 
194 10 USCA § 836 (West 2002). 
195 Dept. of Def, Mil. Comm'n Order No.1 (March 21,2002), available 
http://www.defenselink.miVnewslMar2002/n03212002_200203213. 
196 Id. 
197 Id. at Section 4 (C)(2)(a)(b). 
198 Id. at Section 6(D)(5)(b). 
199 Id. at Section 6(D)(1). 
200 Id. at Section 6(D)(2)(a). 
201 Id. at Section 6(H)(3). 
202 Id. at Section 6(H)(4). 
203 Id. 
204 Id. at Section 6 (H)(2)(6). 
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F. TITLE 18 OF THE UNITED STATES CODE SECTION 4001(A) 
Congress, through Title 18 of the United States Code 
Section 4001(a), prohibited the detention of citizens who are 
not officially charged with a crime. 205 However, President 
Bush's authority for detaining Padilla and Hamdi comes under 
the guise of Congress' Joint Resolution 23 and the President's 
Military Order.206 This authority arguably allows the 
government to detain citizens indefinitely, without right to 
counsel, and incommunicado.207 
The language of the Title 18 Section 4001(a) establishes 
limitations on the control and detention of citizens. 208 The 
statute reads: "[n]o citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise 
detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of 
Congress."209 In Howe v. Smith, a prisoner held in Vermont, 
who was transferred to federal prison, challenged the Attorney 
General and the Federal Government's authority to receive and 
hold him in a federal penitentiary.210 The Court acknowledged 
in a footnote that the language of Section 4001(a) prohibited 
detention of "any kind" without congressional authorization.2l1 
The Court interpreted Section 4001(a) to mean that persons 
protected by the Constitution shall not be detained indefinitely 
without congressional authority. 
In 1971, Section 4001(a) was amended to prohibit the 
detention and control of United States citizens where statutory 
basis for incarceration exist.212 Moreover, the amended statute 
repealed the Emergency Detention Act of 1950 (Title II of the 
Internal Security Act of 1950), which authorized the 
establishment of detention camps and imposed conditions for 
their use.213 The Emergency Detention Act of 1950 was 
205 18 USCA § 4001(a) (West 2002); See also Stephen I. Vladeck, A Small Problem of 
Precedent: 18 U.S.C. §4001(a) and the Detention of U.S. Citizen "Enemy Combatants," 
112 YALE L.J. 961 (2003) (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) in light of the detention of 
United States citizens as enemy combatants). 
206 See supra note 28 at 3-4; Hamdi, 294 F.3d at 601. 
207 Pet'r Reply supra note 42 at 5; Hamdi, 294 F.3d at 601. 
208 18 USCA § 4001(a) (West 2002); See supra note 9 at 11. 
209 18 USCA § 4001(a) (West 2002); See supra note 9 at 11. 
210 Howe v. Smith, 452 U.S. 473, 479 (1981); See supra note 9 at 11. Only one 
Supreme Court case has made mention of Section 4001(a). Id. 
211 Howe v. Smith, 452 U.S. at 479. 
212 Pub. L No. 92-128; See supra note 9 at 11. 
213 Pub. L. No. 92-128; See supra note 9 at 11. 
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enacted at the onset of the Korean War.214 The Act established 
procedures for dealing with individuals who intended to 
commit, or commited acts of sabotage or espionage.215 The 
House Report acknowledged that the statute was subject to 
grave challenge, as it required only the intent to commit, or a 
reasonable belief that an individual would commit, sabotage or 
espionage.216 
G. INTERNATIONAL LAws AND TREATY CONSIDERATIONS 
In 1945, the United Nations created the United Nations 
Charter.217 The Charter was established to address threats to 
international peace. Particularly, the Charter identified basic 
humanitarian standards to be followed by all United Nations 
members at times of peace and war.218 On December 10, 1948, 
the United States signed the United Nations' Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (hereinafter, "Declaration").219 
The Declaration is a pledge to promote fundamental human 
rights and dignity and to maintain friendly relationships 
between nations.220 As a member of the Charter and as a 
signatory of the Declaration, the United States pledged to 
respect human dignity and rights and to recognize 
fundamental freedoms. 221 Specifically, the Declaration declares 
214 Pub. L. No. 92-128; See supra note 9 at 11, fn 15. 
215 Id. 
216 Pub. L. No. 92-128. 
217 Inter-Allied Declaration, June 12, 1941, available 
http://www.un.org/aboutunlmilestones.htm. The Inter-Allied Declaration signed on 
June 12, 1941, "was the first step towards the establishment of the United Nations." 
Id. This Declaration was an agreement "to work together, with other free peoples, both 
in war and in peace." Id. On August 14, 1941 the President of the United States, 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt, and Prime Minister Winston Churchill of the United 
Kingdom proposed a set of principles intended to maintain international peace and 
security. Id. During World War II, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, along with the 
heads of twenty-six other nations pledged their governments to continue to fight 
against Germany, Italy, Japan and associated countries while recognizing basic 
humanitarian rights. Id. The Charter was created in 1945 at a United Nations 
conference in San Francisco with representatives of 50 countries. Id. 
218 Id. 
219 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Office of the U.N.High Commissioner for 
Human Rights Geneva, Switzerland, Press Kit (Dec. 10, 1948), available 
http://www3.itu.int./udhr/miscinfo/carta.htm. 
220 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, available 
http://www.un.org/rights/50/decla.htm. 
221 Id. 
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that the preservation of human rights is essential,222 Article 3 
of the Declaration preserves individual's rights to life, liberty 
and security. 223 
The day after the September 11th attacks, the United 
Nations Security Council enacted Resolution 1368. 224 The 
Resolution sought to reaffIrm the purpose under which the 
Charter was created and to address threats to international 
peace.225 The Resolution called upon its Member States to 
cooperate with one another to bring to justice those responsible 
for the September 11th attacks.226 
H. GENEVA CONVENTIONS 
The term enemy combatant, which Padilla and Hamdi are 
designated, is raised in the Third and Fourth Geneva 
Conventions.227 The Conventions govern the treatment of 
lawful and unlawful enemy combatants.228 Further, the 
Conventions established the foundation for contemporary 
humanitarian law.229 
222 [d. 
223 [d. at art. 3. Article 3 of the Declaration preserves individual's rights to life, 
liberty and security. [d. Article 8 of the Declaration authorizes an effective remedy by 
competent national tribunals when fundamental rights by the constitution or laws are 
violated. [d. at. art. 8. Article 9 of the Declaration prohibits its members from 
subjecting individuals to arbitrary arrests, detentions or exiles. [d. at art. 9. In 
addition, Article 28 entitles everyone to a social and international order where the 
rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration are recognized. [d. at. 28. 
224 U.N. Security Council Resolution 1368, Sept. 12,2001, available 
http://www.state.gov/p/io/rls/othr/2001l4899.htm. 
225 [d. 
226 [d. 
227 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, opened for 
signature Aug. 12, 1949-Feb. 12, 1950, 6 U.S.T. 3316 (date of entry into force with 
respect to the United States of America: Feb. 2, 1956) [hereinafter Geneva III], 
available 
http://www .icrc.org/ihl.nsfi7c4d08d9b287 a42141256739003e636b/6fef854a351 7b7 5ac 12 
5641e004age68?OpenDocument; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protections of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949-Feb. 12, 1950, 6 
U.S.T. 3516 (date of entry into force with respect to the United States of America: Feb. 
2, 1956) [hereinafter Geneva IV], available 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsfi7c4d08d9b287a42141256739003e636b/6756482d86146898c1 
25641e004aa3c5?OpenDocument; See also supra note 9 at 13. 
228 HR 5071, 107th Cong., 148 CONGo REC. 4402 (2002); See generally The History of 
Humanitarian Law, available http://www.redcross.lv/enlconventions.htm#geneva (last 
visited Feb. 18, 2003). 
229 See generally The History of Humanitarian Law, available 
http://www.redcross.lv/enlconventions.htm#Geneva (last visited Feb. 18, 2003). The 
Geneva Conventions were written rules to protect the victims of conflicts; open to all 
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On August 12, 1949, sixty-one Nations, including the 
United States, signed the Geneva Conventions.23o The 
Conventions established regulations for persons during an 
official declaration of war or armed conflict. 231 The First and 
Second Geneva Conventions set out standards for the wounded 
and the sick ofthe armed forces in the field and at sea.232 Each 
Convention is premised on the notion that each individual who 
finds themselves under the authority of an adverse party is 
entitled to respect for his or her life, dignity, personal rights, 
and political and religious convictions.233 Each individual is 
protected against acts of violence or reprisal and each is also 
entitled to communicate with his or her families and receive 
aid.234 
The Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions specifically 
address prisoners of war and lawful enemy combatants.235 The 
Third Geneva Convention governs the treatment of prisoners of 
war.236 Prisoners of war fall into six specific categories.237 
These categories include: members of the Armed Forces of 
either side of the conflict; members that are commanded by a 
party of the armed conflict or contain fixed distinctive insignia 
or carry arms openly or operations comport with the laws of 
war; members who proclaim allegiance to armed forces not 
recognized by the detaining power; people who accompany the 
states and the obligation extends without discrimination to the wounded and sick; and 
respect for medical personnel transporting equipment. Id. 
230 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and 
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949-Feb. 
12, 1950, 6 U.S.T. 3217 (date of entry into force with respect to the United States of 
America: Feb. 2, 1956) [hereinafter Geneva II], available 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/7c4d08d9b287a42141256739003e636b/44072487ec4c2131c12 
5641e004a9977?OpenDocument. 
231 Id.; ABA Task Force on Treatment of Enemy Combatants, Preliminary Report at 
13 (Aug. 8, 2002) available at http://www.abanet.orgneadership/enemy_combatants.pdf; 
See generally supra note 228. 
232 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and 
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949-Feb. 12, 1950, 6 
U.S.T. 3114 (date of entry into force with respect to the United States of America: Feb. 
2, 1956)[hereinafter Geneva I], available 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/7c4d08d9b287a42141256739003e636b/fe20c3d903ce27e3c12 
5641e004a92f3?OpenDocument; See supra note 230. 
233 See supra note 229 and accompanying text. 
234 See supra note 229 and accompanying text. 
235 Geneva III and IV, supra note 227. 
236 Geneva III, supra note 227, art. 4, 6 U.S.T. at 3320,3322. 
237 Id. 
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armed forces but are not members; crew members; inhabitants 
of non-occupied territory are lawful enemy combatants. 238 
The Geneva Conventions provide a minimum standard for 
the humane treatment of prisoners of war.239 Distinctions 
based on race, religion, sex, wealth or other similar criteria are 
prohibited.240 Further, violence, torture, humiliation, 
degrading treatment, sentencing and execution are barred, 
absent the safeguards afforded to civilians.241 Additionally, 
treatment for the sick and wounded is required.242 
Even those not considered prisoners of war, within the 
language of the Third Geneva Convention, are still afforded 
protection under the Fourth Geneva Convention. The Fourth 
Geneva Convention governs the treatment of civilian persons 
in time of war.243 Article 4 of the Fourth Geneva Convention 
provides protections to people who are not nationals of the 
detaining power or adverse power and find themselves in the 
conflict.244 A person who is a threat to security is not protected 
under the Geneva Conventions.245 Article 5 of the Fourth 
Geneva Convention specifically excludes individuals who are 
suspected of, or engage in, hostile activities that affect the state 
security from protections prescribed under the Geneva 
Conventions.246 The Fourth Convention, however, clearly 
states that no one who is protected should be deprived of the 
type of fair trial prescribed by the Geneva Convention.247 
1. MILITARY TRIBUNALS ACT 2002 AND THE SEPARATION OF 
POWERS 
While in military custody, Padilla and Hamdi may be 
subject to the laws governing military tribunals. Congress, 
however, did not authorized the use of military tribunals.248 
On July 9, 2002, California Congressmen, Adam Schiff, 
238 Id. 
239 Id. at art. 3,6 U.S.T. at 3318, 3320. 
240 Id. 
241 Id. 
242 Id. 
243 Geneva IV, supra note 227. 
244 Geneva IV, supra note 227, art. 4, 6 U.S.T. at 3520. 
245 Geneva IV, supra note 227, art. 5, 6 U.S.T. at 3520, 3522. 
246 Id. 
247 Id. 
248 HR 5071, 107th Cong., 148 CONGo REC. 4402 (2002). 
29
Ramirez: Unequal Treatment of U.S. Citizens
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2003
236 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33 
introduced a bill seeking congressional authorization for 
tribunals to prosecute unlawful combatants in the war on 
terrorism.249 Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution gives 
Congress the power to create tribunals inferior to the Supreme 
Court, which includes the power to authorize military 
tribunals.250 These powers not only permit Congress to 
authorize military tribunals, but also permit the creation of 
rules governing captures and the rules that define and punish 
offenses.251 
Schiffs bill, the Military Tribunals Act of 2002, seeks 
jurisdiction over non-citizens, non-United States residents, 
"unlawful combatants, al-Qaeda members, and those working 
in concert with them to attack the United States."252 Under the 
bill, the right to due process and humane treatment and the 
right to petition for writ of habeas corpus in the military 
tribunals are preserved.253 The bill requires the President to 
report to Congress information on the detainees, the basis for 
their detention, and a timetable for their detention. 254 The 
trial proceedings are open to the public.255 Evidence, however, 
from the Federal Government may be concealed if the evidence 
hinders the prosecution, military, or intelligence.256 
II. DISCUSSION 
The events occurring on September 11, 2001, were tragic. 
Thousands of innocent lives were lost as the result of terrorist 
attacks. Those responsible for the attacks should be punished. 
A potential hazard in seeking justice for our nation is the loss 
of constitutional safeguards afforded to citizens of the United 
States. The cornerstone upon which America was built, the 
United States Constitution, must not be jeopardized. America 
is premised on the concept of equal protection under the 
Constitution. Under the Constitution, United States citizens 
are guaranteed a right to due process. Fundamental due 
249 Id. 
250 Id. 
251 Id. 
252 Id. 
253 Id. 
254 Id. 
255 Id. 
256 Id. 
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process includes the right to counsel, the right to confront and 
cross-examine one's accusers, the right to a jury trial and the 
right to appeal. 
Padilla and Hamdi are citizens detained indefinitely 
without being charged with a crime, without right to counsel, 
and incommunicado. Allegedly, Padilla and Hamdi possess 
information of al Qaeda that could aid the United States in 
preventing terrorist attacks. Allegedly, they conspired with al 
Qaeda in planning and carrying out acts of terrorism. In 
contrast, another citizen, Lindh, was permitted to exercise his 
rights as guaranteed by the Constitution. In Lindh's 
sentencing memorandum, he admits to possessing knowledge 
and intelligence that could assist the United States in 
countering future terrorists acts, the same reasons the 
government cites as the basis of Padilla and Hamdi's detention. 
257 Lindh, however, was officially charged with crimes and 
afforded access to counsel. In a civilian courtroom, Lindh pled 
guilty to aiding the Taliban and carrying arms in the 
commission of that crime. 
The Association of Business Trial Lawyers (hereinafter, 
"ABTL") coordinated a panel on December 10, 2002, addressing 
the civil liberties and security issues the Padilla, Hamdi, and 
Lindh cases presented.258 Frank Dunham, the Federal Public 
Defender representing Hamdi, initially believed his client's 
case was analogous to the John Walker Lindh case.259 In fact, 
Dunham planned to borrow the briefs submitted by Lindh's 
attorney to the Eastern District of Virginia.260 Daniel Collins, 
Associate Deputy Attorney General for the United States 
Department of Justice, representing the government at the 
257 See supra note 146. 
258 Association of Business Trial Lawyers, Can Civil Liberties Be Preserved During 
the War on Terrorism? December 10, 2002, in San Francisco, California. The focus of 
this panel was to discuss the hundreds of people who have been incarcerated for an 
indefinite period of time, without counsel, or judicial review. Specifically, the debate 
addressed the balance of civil liberties and security in light of the apparent presence of 
sleeper cells in the United States. The moderator of the panel was James J. 
Brosnahan, Partner, Morrison & Foerster LLP. The speakers included: The Honorable 
Michael Daly Hawkins, United States Circuit Judge, 9th Circuit; Steven R. Shapiro, 
National Legal Director, ACLU; Daniel Collins, Associate Deputy Attorney General, 
United States Department of Justice; Frank Dunham, The Federal Public Defender, 
Eastern District of Virginia, representing Yasser Hamdi; Robert Rubin, Legal Director, 
Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights, representing Hady Omar. 
259 [d. 
260 [d. 
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ABTL, refused to comment on Padilla or Hamdi's case.261 
According to Dean Keane, however, Hamdi and Lindh's case 
are factually similar, as they are both United States citizens 
detained in Mghanistan.262 Thus, Padilla's case should present 
a stronger argument for allowing him constitutional 
protections guaranteed under the Constitution to all citizens. 
A. ENEMY COMBATANTS 
The government incorrectly relies on Ex Parte Quirin for 
its authority to label citizens as enemy combatants.263 Ex Parte 
Quirin arose during World War II, at a time when Congress 
authorized the use of military tribunals for the prosecution of 
those accused of violating the laws of war. In contrast to the 
facts in Ex Parte Quirin, the Joint Resolution Congress passed 
on September 14, 2001, did not amount to an official 
congressional declaration of war. Congress authorized 
President Bush to use military force only in response to the 
September 11th attacks and in preventing future terrorist acts. 
Moreover, the Joint Resolution did not address the labeling of 
citizens as enemy combatants as was the case in Ex Parte 
Quirin. In fact, nowhere in the Joint Resolution was the term 
enemy combatant used.264 
In the present situation, the SDNY rendered its decision 
on the Padilla case on December 4, 2002. The SDNY noted 
that an official declaration of war was not necessary. In 
reaching this conclusion, the SDNY cited the Prize cases as 
authority and highlighted the history of armed conflicts in 
which Congress did not declare war.265 In fact, the SDNY 
261 Id. 
262 See supra note 10. 
263 See discussion supra Part I. D. 
264 S.J. Res. 23, 107'h Congo (2001) (enacted). 
265 Op. and Order at 50, Padilla V. Bush (Dec. 4, 2002) citing The Prize Cases, 67 
U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862), available 
http://news.findlaw.comlhdocs/docs/terrorismlpadillabush120402opn.pdf. In the Prize 
cases, the Supreme Court recognized that the President has the power to initiate or 
declare war. Id. In addition, "war may exist without a declaration on either side." Id. 
The SDNY cites the history of armed conflicts that were not officially declared by 
Congress but nonetheless amount to a war. Id. at 52. The naval war against France in 
the 1970's was not declared but authorized by Congress. Id. The SDNY also lists the 
Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Persian Gulf War, and the Kosovo bombing 
campaign. Id. 
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reasoned that an official congressional declaration of war 
seems to be the exception rather than the rule. 
However, Steven Shapiro, ACLU panel speaker at the 
ABTL and Brosnahan, distinguishes the war on terrorism from 
the armed conflicts cited by the SDNY on two grounds.266 
First, the war on terrorism deals with various geographical 
10cations.267 The location of the battlefield is constantly 
changing. Second, the war on terrorism is not with a nation 
state.268 Thus, there is no foreseeable conclusion like a truce, 
treaty, or cease-fire ending this war.269 As such, the current 
situation is distinguishable from any prior armed conflict or 
official war.270 
Arguably, even if the Joint Resolution is similar to a 
declaration of war, Ex Parte Quirin is still inapplicable. The 
accused in Ex Parte Quirin did not challenge their status as 
enemy combatants. Rather, the accused challenged the 
President's authority to prosecute prisoners of war in military 
tribunals. Finally, the accused in Ex Parte Quirin were not 
held indefinitely without charge, nor were they held 
incommunicado without right to counsel. Nor did, Daniel 
Collins at the ABTL panel, dispute Frank Dunham's assertion 
that the accused in Ex Parte Quirin were not detained 
indefinitely, without charge, incommunicado and without right 
to counsel.271 Ex Parte Quirin fails to support the government's 
current practice of holding citizens indefinitely without charge. 
Therefore, Ex Parte Quirin is inapplicable. 
In addition, the government's reliance on Territo as 
authority to label Padilla an enemy combatant is misplaced. In 
Territo, the detainee was captured abroad and labeled a 
prisoner of war.272 In contrast, Padilla was captured in the 
United States and not labeled a prisoner of war.273 Although 
Hamdi and Lindh were captured abroad they were not labeled 
prisoners of war. Therefore, Territo is inapplicable. 
266 See supra note 258. 
267 Id. 
266 Id. 
269 Id. 
270 Id. 
271 Id. 
272 In re Territo, 156 F.2d at 146. 
273 See supra note 42 at 6. 
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Furthermore, the court in Territo failed to address the 
legality of labeling citizens as enemy combatants. Rather, 
Territo addressed the government's ability to detain United 
States citizens in military custody as prisoners of war during 
an official declaration of war. It is indisputable that during an 
official declaration of war those captured in the battlefield may 
be labeled prisoners of war. Neither Padilla nor Hamdi are 
viewed as prisoners of war, but enemy combatants. Lindh, on 
the other hand, was viewed as a citizen with Constitutional 
protections. Further, at the time Padilla, Hamdi, and Lindh 
were detained, Congress did not declare war. Therefore, 
Territo did not support the government's stance of appointing 
citizens enemy combatants, stripped of their constitutional 
rights, merely on the government's "say-so."274 
Interestingly, Daniel Collins, representing the United 
States Department of Justice at the ABTL panel, was unable to 
provide a definition or specific criteria used in appointing 
enemy combatants.275 Rather, Collins cited the opinion in Ex 
Parte Quirin and the Constitution as conferring the President 
with the authority to label individuals enemy combatants. 276 
Danger exists without clearer guidelines for classifying citizens 
enemy combatants. Shapiro argues the ability to categorize 
citizens enemy combatants must not lie solely on the executive 
branch. 277 Shapiro stresses the necessity in preserving the 
United States' system of checks and balances in the 
designation of enemy combatants.278 
B. THE MILITARY ORDER 
While the Military Order proclaims that the United States 
is in a state of "national security," arguably justifying the use 
of the Armed Forces, the Military Order is inapplicable. The 
Military Order fails to support the detention of Padilla and 
Hamdi because the Military Order does not extend to American 
citizens. The Military Order specifically states that individuals 
covered by this Order are non-United States citizens. Thus, 
274 See supra note 153 and accompanying text. 
275 See supra note 258. 
276 [d. 
277 [d. 
278 [d. 
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citizens like Padilla, Hamdi, and Lindh are excluded from this 
order. 
Although Section 2 of the Military Order gives the 
President discretion from '''time to time" to authorize 
perpetrators connected with international terrorism to be tried 
before a military commission, the Military Order provides no 
guidelines or criteria for determining who may be detained 
from "time to time" by the President.279 The Military Order 
fails to define what from "time to time" means. Since Padilla 
and Hamdi are in military custody pursuant to the Military 
Order, Section 2 of the order is the only clause that may cover 
United States citizens. The vagueness in this clause 
demonstrates the need for clearer guidelines to determine who, 
in fact, is an enemy combatant. 
While President Bush cites the Senate Joint Resolution 23 
as authority for implementing the military tribunals, his 
reliance is misplaced. The Senate Joint Resolution simply 
authorizes the use of military force, not military tribunals. The 
use of military force allows the President to use the armed 
forces in capturing those who are responsible for the September 
11 th attacks and those connected with international terrorism. 
In contrast to using military force, the military order permits 
individuals to be tried and punished in military tribunals. 
The Military Order also cites Section 836 of Title 10 of the 
United States Code as authority for implementing the Military 
Tribunals. Section 836 authorizes the President to prescribe 
rules governing military tribunals that does not violate the 
Constitution.280 The President does not have the power to 
authorize the use of military tribunals. Rather, only Congress 
holds this power as derived from the Constitution. A 
distinction must be drawn between implementing military 
tribunals and prescribing rules governing military tribunals. 
Even though Section 836 prohibits the President from 
making rules governing military tribunals in violation of the 
Constitution, the President did just that. The President 
authorized the Military Commission Order, an order 
prescribing the policies and procedures for the military 
279 See supra note 191. 
280 10 USCA § 836 (West 2002). 
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tribunals that violate the Constitution.281 The Order outlines 
the procedures for trials by military tribunals against non-
United States Citizens.282 The Order implements policy and 
procedures for the military commission trials in accordance 
with the President's November 13, 2001 Military Order.283 The 
Order allows the accused to chose between a "detailed defense 
counsel" and a civilian attorney.284 
In addition to denying Padilla and Hamdi access to counsel 
as authorized under the Order, the Order's guidelines do not 
comport with the general principles of evidence and procedures 
that govern civilian courts. First, the guidelines permit only 
limited disclosure of "protected information" from 
documents.285 Exactly what information is protected is left up 
to the discretion of the Presiding Officer.286 In addition, the 
Presiding Officer or the Appointed Authority may close the 
proceedings because of protected information.287 They may 
even exclude the accused and his or her counsel from the 
proceedings.288 
Second, under the Order any evidence is admissible that 
has probative value to a reasonable person.289 This standard 
supplants the Federal Rules of Evidence, which govern civilian 
courts, and allow only relevant evidence.29o In civilian courts, 
the judge is permitted to exclude relevant evidence, if the 
danger outweighs the probative value.291 Essentially, the 
Order may allow every piece of evidence against the accused to 
be considered, while in a civilian courtroom the same evidence 
may be excluded. Arguably, without the limitations of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence, irrelevant facts and proof may be 
considered. 
Third, the Order allows the Commission, on its own 
initiative, to summon and hear witnesses via telephone, 
281 Id.; Mil. Order 66 Fed. Reg. 57833 (Nov. 13, 2001). 
282 Mil. Order 66 Fed. Reg. 57833 at Section 1 (Nov. 13, 2001). 
283 Id. 
284 See supra note 195 at Section 4(C). 
285 Id. at Section 6(D)(5). 
286 Id. at Section 6(D)(1). 
287 Id. at Sections 6(D)(5)(c) and 6(B)(3). 
288 Id. at Section 6(B)(3). 
289 Id. at Section 6(D)(1). 
290 FED. R. EVID. 401. 
291 FED. R. EVID. 403. 
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audiovisual or any other means.292 In civilian courts, judges 
are allowed to call witnesses.293 A witness's testimony via 
telephone, audiovisual or other means, however, must be 
deemed unavailable by the court as a requisite to 
admissibility.294 
Lastly, the Order does not permit an independent judicial 
review.295 The reVIew process consists only of an 
administrative review conducted by an "Appointed 
Authority."296 The "Appointed Authority" may be the Secretary 
of Defense or a designee.297 The Order does not explain who 
the "Appointed Authority" or designee might be. Mter the 
administrative evaluation, panels consisting of three Military 
Officers review the record of the trial. 298 The review panel may 
either forward the record of trial to the Secretary of Defense or 
return the case to the "Appointed Authority" for further 
proceedings but only if a "material error of law occurred."299 
The final decision-maker, however, is the President or the 
Secretary of State.300 Under this scheme, the President acts 
both as prosecutor and judge. He designates citizens as enemy 
combatants and makes the final decision on appeal. Therefore, 
there is no guarantee of fundamental fairness. The purpose 
behind the implementation of the Military Commission Order 
is to ensure a full and fair trial before a military commission. 
The procedures, however, prescribed in the Order conflict with 
the purpose behind its implementation. The Order's 
292 See supra note 195 at Section 6(A)(5). 
293 FED. R. EVID. 614. 
294 See generally FED. R. EVID. 801, 802, 803. In Brumley v. Wingard, 269 F.3d 629 
(2001), the petitioner was convicted in state court for "complicity to commit aggravated 
murder with two death penalty specifications and kidnapping." Id. at 633. The 
petitioner argued the state court erroneously allowed a videotape of an incarcerated 
witness without first finding the individual unavailable. Id. at 637. The court 
reasoned in some cases the state's compelling interest such as, protecting child abuse 
survivors, outweighs the defendant's right to confrontation. Id. at 644. Generally the 
court, however, must find the witness unavailable. Id. Nonetheless, the court held the 
admission of the videotape was not harmless error and affirmed the lower court's 
decision. Id. at 644-645, 647. See also Edward K. Esping, Stephanie A. Giggetts, 
Christine M. Gimeno, Rachel M. Kane, & Susan L. Thomas, Testimony by Closed-
Circuit Television or Videotape, 25 Ohio Jur. 3d Crim Law § 468 (Nov. 2002). 
296 See supra note 195 at Section 6(H). 
296 Id. at Section 6(H)(3). 
297 Id. 
298 Id. at Section 6(H)(4). 
299 Id. 
300 Id. at Section 6(H)(6). 
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procedures conflict with a full and fair trial under the 
Constitution. 
C. TITLE 18 OF THE UNITED STATES CODE SECTION 4001(A) 
That the laws of civilian courts are inapplicable to military 
court may, in some respects, explain the conflict between 
congressional legislature and the government's action.30l 
Whatever the explanation may be, it is essential that Padilla 
and Hamdi, as United States citizens, be given the same 
constitutional safeguards, as Lindh.302 
The SDNY did not explicitly rule that Section 4001(a) was 
inapplicable to Padilla's case.303 Section 4001(a) prohibits the 
detention of any person protected by the Constitution without 
congressional authority. Padilla and Hamdi are not been 
officially charged with crimes, nor has Congress authorized 
their detention. The executive branch has unilaterally 
designated Padilla and Hamdi enemy combatants without 
congressional authority. Thus, the detention of Padilla and 
Hamdi violates Section 4001(a).304 
Additionally, when Title 18 of the United States Code 
Section 4001(a) was amended in 1971, the House Report noted 
that the statute was subject to severe challenge because it only 
required reasonable grounds for believing someone intended to 
engage, or engaged in, espionage or sabotage.305 The belief that 
a person in the future could engage in espionage or sabotage 
allowed the government to preserve information essential to 
the defense of an accused.30G Similarly, President Bush's 
November 13, 2001 Military Order raises similar concerns. 
The Military Order allows an individual who intends to 
undertake future terrorist attacks against the United States to 
be tried before military commissions. Similar to the 1971 
amendment to Title 18 Section 4001, the Military Order only 
requires the intent of an individual to engage in future 
301 Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. at 137. 
302 See supra note 146 at 11; Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. at 120. 
303 See supra note 68 at 67-74. 
304 See supra note 205, 208. 
305 Puh.L. No. 92-128; See supra note 9 at 11, fn 15. 
306 Id. 
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terrorist attacks. Therefore, history dictates that this Military 
Order should be subject to "grave challenge."307 
D. INTERNATIONAL LAws AND TREATY CONSIDERATIONS 
The United Nations Charter was created to fight all 
threats to international peace. Combating all threats to 
international peace is important for the United States as well 
as other signatory nations. Clearly, those responsible for the 
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks should be punished. 
Punishing individuals, however, who threaten international 
peace should not permit the government to label certain 
citizens enemy combatants and strip them of their 
constitutional rights for an indefinite period of time. Punishing 
individuals who threaten international peace should not mean 
international laws, which the United States has pledged to 
abide by, can be ignored. As a member of the Charter, 
international laws and treaties bind the United States. 
Under the Declaration, every individual is protected 
against arbitrary arrests and detentions. Arguably, the 
government's designation of United States citizens Padilla, 
Hamdi, and Lindh as enemy combatants seems inconsistent 
and arbitrary. Since the United States government's actions 
may conflict with the Declaration, an international treaty, a 
close look at all applicable laws is essential. 
In addition, the Declaration preserves an individual's right 
to life and liberty. The label enemy combatant allows the 
government to detain citizens incommunicado and without a 
right to counsel. Padilla and Hamdi are not allowed to 
communicate with family or friends. Further, they are 
detained without right to counsel. Such circumstances may 
violate the United Nations treaty. As United States citizens, 
Padilla and Hamdi are guaranteed rights under international 
United Nations agreements. 
307 [d. 
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E. GENEVA CONVENTIONS 
Protections prescribed by the Geneva Conventions to 
protect victims of conflicts should extend to include Padilla and 
Hamdi.308 The Conventions provide a minimum standard for 
humane treatment, entitling every person to dignity and 
respect for one's life. Moreover, the Conventions make a clear 
distinction between the protections afforded to lawful enemy 
combatants, protected prisoners of war, and unlawful enemy 
combatants, unprotected prisoners of war. An unlawful enemy 
combatant is one who is suspected of engaging, or has engaged, 
in hostile activities that threaten the security of the state. 
Padilla and Hamdi could conceivably fit under the following 
categories, as defined in the Third Geneva Convention, 
guaranteeing them certain protections: members of the Armed 
Forces of either side of the armed conflict, members that are 
commanded by a party to the conflict or operations comport 
with the laws of war, loyal members of the armed forces but 
who are not recognized by the detaining power, and crew 
members.309 
Under the Fourth Geneva Convention, Hamdi could be 
categorized as a lawful combatant since he was captured in 
Mghanistan. Although Padilla was captured in the United 
States the Fourth Geneva Convention makes clear that every 
person is entitled to humane treatment.310 Therefore, Padilla 
and Hamdi should be given a hearing prescribed by the 
Conventions to determine whether they are entitled to the 
status of prisoner of war.3l1 
F. MILITARY TRIBUNALS ACT 2002 AND THE SEPARATION OF 
POWERS 
As of the date of this writing, no action has been taken by 
Congress to implement the Military Tribunals Act. The Act 
seeks to establish the jurisdiction of military tribunals "over 
non-U.S. residents, unlawful combatants, al-Qaeda members 
and those working in concert with them to attack the United 
308 See supra note 227 and accompanying text. 
309 See supra note 227 and accompanying text. 
310 Geneva IV supra note 227. 
311 See supra note 9 at 24. 
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States."312 The military tribunal decisions are subject to 
challenge because Congress did not specifically authorized the 
use of military tribunals. 
Even if this Act is passed, it is inapplicable to United 
States citizens like Padilla, Hamdi or Lindh. The Act is 
specifically geared towards non -citizens, such as those detained 
at Guantanamo base. Our government should impose a set 
standard of guidelines for labeling citizens enemy combatants. 
III. RECOMMENDATIONS 
To address the concern that the government is 
inconsistently labeling citizens enemy combatants, while others 
in similar situations are afforded the rights guaranteed to 
criminal defendants in a civilian courtroom, specific 
recommendations are offered. In civilian courts, criminal 
defendants are subject to a preliminary proceeding to 
determine if probable cause exists for the criminal charges. 
Similarly, citizens identified as enemy combatant should be 
subject to a preliminary proceeding. The preliminary 
proceeding should be used to determine if the status is lawful, 
since enemy combatants, per the government, may be detained 
indefinitely for the duration of the conflict. Conceivably, the 
duration of the conflict against international terrorism may 
never end. 
Evidence that the individual is an enemy combatant 
connected to international terrorism should be submitted to the 
United States District Court for review. The government's 
burden should be analogous to criminal proceedings. The 
District Court should review the status of an enemy combatant 
in camera. Allowing the court to review the necessary 
information in camera will protect information from leaking 
out to the public and possible accomplices of the perpetrator. 
This process will preserve the confidentiality of the 
government's sources of information. Additionally, the District 
Court should examine whether the designation of enemy 
combatant violates treaties of international law. 
The alleged enemy combatant should be given access to 
counsel in order to ensure procedural and substantive 
312 HR 5071, 107th Cong., 148 CONGo REC. 4402 (2002). 
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constitutional safeguards guaranteed to all citizens in civilian 
courts. Each enemy combatant should have the choice between 
a court appointed defense counselor privately retained counsel. 
Each enemy combatant should also be permitted to 
communicate freely with his or her counsel while in custody. 
Additionally, the enemy combatant should be allowed to 
communicate with his family and friends. Limitations should 
be effected to ensure information aiding or leading to 
international terrorism is prevented. In addition, each 
conversation and visit should be monitored and supervised 
except with his or her counsel. If conversations in a language 
other than English occur, at the expense of the accused, a 
translator certified by the court should translate the 
conversation into English for the government. In the event 
that the accused cannot afford a translator, one should be 
provided. 
Even after a review by the district court deeming the 
individual an enemy combatant, a hearing prescribed by the 
Geneva Conventions should be allowed. The hearing will 
determine if the status of a prisoner of war is appropriate. 
Implementing procedures similar to those in criminal 
proceedings will ensure that the government's standards for 
labeling citizens enemy combatant is not arbitrarily imposed. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Requiring a basic level of due process for United States 
citizens counterbalances any impediment resulting from the 
implementation of procedures to non-selectively designated 
enemy combatant. While the government's job may become 
more difficult by requiring concrete evidence of enemy 
combatant status, this is not a permissible reason to erode 
constitutional safeguards. Despite the challenges presented by 
preserving the Constitution, its historical significance and 
benefits are indispensable and deserving of preservation. 
To fully comply with the Constitution, criminal defendants 
must have access to counsel. Policies that obstruct a citizen's 
right to counsel, especially when the death penalty and life 
sentences are implicated, threaten the fundamental principles 
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on which this country is based. Enemy combatants should be 
treated similarly to criminal defendants because the 
punishment is equally grave. Further, United States citizens 
under the law should be treated equally in crimes and 
punishment. The government's standards of labeling selected 
citizens as enemy combatants should be revised to adequately 
reflect the central importance of preserving constitutional 
protections. 
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